Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

@inproceedings{Finus2003StabilityOC,
  title={Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game},
  author={Michael Finus and E. C. van Ierland},
  year={2003}
}

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