Stability and voting by committees with exit

@article{Berga2004StabilityAV,
  title={Stability and voting by committees with exit},
  author={Dolors Berga and Gustavo Berganti{\~n}os and Jordi Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2004},
  volume={23},
  pages={229-247}
}
Abstract.We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one… CONTINUE READING
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