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Corpus ID: 238856663

Stability and Efficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship

@article{Vijaykumar2021StabilityAE,
title={Stability and Efficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship},
author={Suhas Vijaykumar},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2021},
volume={abs/2110.07024}
}

Abstract. This paper establishes non-asymptotic convergence of the cutoffs in Random serial dictatorship mechanism (RSD), in an environment with many students, many schools, and arbitrary student preferences. Convergence is shown to hold when the number of schools, m, and the number of students, n, satisfy the relation m lnm ≪ n, and we provide an example showing that this result is sharp. We differ significantly from prior work in the mechanism design literature in our use of analytic tools… Expand

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