Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible

@article{Weymark1999SprumontsCO,
  title={Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible},
  author={John A. Weymark},
  journal={Review of Economic Design},
  year={1999},
  volume={4},
  pages={389-393}
}
  • J. Weymark
  • Published 15 December 1999
  • Economics
  • Review of Economic Design
Abstract. Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences. 

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This work identifies the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry.

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We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform

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Please send paper request to MAILTO:efgo@city.edu.hk In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982) on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948) is the only rule that

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