Sperm competition games: a general approach to risk assessment.

  title={Sperm competition games: a general approach to risk assessment.},
  author={Michael A. Ball and G. A. Parker},
  journal={Journal of theoretical biology},
  volume={194 2},
We investigate game theory models of ejaculate expenditure by males in a species where there is a risk probability, q, that females will mate twice before laying a given set of eggs. With frequency 1-q females mate just once; then males optimally ejaculate an arbitrary minimum amount of sperm. The paper extends the analysis of Parker et al. (1997) in which males have limited information about the three risk states of the female: 0 (virgins which will mate now but not again), 1 (virgins which… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.


Publications citing this paper.

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…