• Corpus ID: 10615591

Speed-Security Tradeo s in Blockchain Protocols

  title={Speed-Security Tradeo s in Blockchain Protocols},
  author={Aggelos Kiayias},
  • A. Kiayias
  • Published 2015
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
Transaction processing speed is one of the major considerations in cryptocurrencies that are based on proof of work (POW) such as Bitcoin. At an intuitive level it is widely understood that processing speed is at odds with the security aspects of the underlying POW based consensus mechanism of such protocols, nevertheless the tradeo between the two properties is still not well understood. In this work, motivated by recent work [8] in the formal analysis of the Bitcoin backbone protocol, we… 

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