Speciesism, Arbitrariness and Moral Illusions

@article{Bruers2020SpeciesismAA,
  title={Speciesism, Arbitrariness and Moral Illusions},
  author={Stijn Bruers},
  journal={Philosophia},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-19}
}
  • S. Bruers
  • Published 22 October 2020
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophia
Just as one line appears to be longer than another in an optical illusion, we can have a spontaneous moral judgment that one individual is more important than another. Sometimes such judgments can lead to moral illusions like speciesism and other kinds of discrimination. Moral illusions are persistent spontaneous judgments that violate our deepest moral values and distract us away from a rational, authentic ethic. They generate pseudo-ethics, similar to pseudoscience. The antidote against moral… 

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