Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

@inproceedings{Bergh2002SpatialEO,
  title={Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game},
  author={V. Van den Bergh},
  year={2002}
}
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood… CONTINUE READING
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