Sovereign debt auctions : Uniform or discriminatory ?

@inproceedings{Brenner2009SovereignDA,
  title={Sovereign debt auctions : Uniform or discriminatory ?},
  author={Menachem Brenner and Dan Galai and Orly Sade},
  year={2009}
}
Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction. An important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: uniform versus discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the dominance of one type of auction over the other. We investigate the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions. We find that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction… CONTINUE READING

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