Corpus ID: 33609572

Sorting in public school districts under the Boston Mechanism

@inproceedings{Calsamiglia2017SortingIP,
  title={Sorting in public school districts under the Boston Mechanism},
  author={Caterina Calsamiglia and Francisco Mart{\'i}nez-Mora and Antonio Miralles},
  year={2017}
}
We show that the widely used Boston Mechanism (BM) fosters ability and socioeconomic segregation across otherwise identical public schools, even when schools do not have priorities over local students. Our model includes an endogenous component of school quality - determined by the peer group - and an exogenous one. If there is an exogenously worse public school, BM generates sorting of types between a priori equally good public schools: an elitist public school emerges. A richer model with… Expand

Figures from this paper

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 45 REFERENCES
Constrained school choice
The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona
Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? Comment
Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects
...
1
2
3
4
5
...