Sorting big data by revealed preference with application to college ranking

  title={Sorting big data by revealed preference with application to college ranking},
  author={Xingwei Hu},
  journal={Journal of Big Data},
  • Xingwei Hu
  • Published 2020
  • Computer Science, Mathematics, Economics
  • Journal of Big Data
When ranking big data observations such as colleges in the United States, diverse consumers reveal heterogeneous preferences. The objective of this paper is to sort out a linear ordering for these observations and to recommend strategies to improve their relative positions in the ranking. A properly sorted solution could help consumers make the right choices, and governments make wise policy decisions. Previous researchers have applied exogenous weighting or multivariate regression approaches… Expand
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