Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games

@article{Hofbauer2000SophisticatedII,
  title={Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games},
  author={J. Hofbauer and K. Schlag},
  journal={Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  year={2000},
  volume={10},
  pages={523-543}
}
  • J. Hofbauer, K. Schlag
  • Published 2000
  • Economics
  • Journal of Evolutionary Economics
  • Abstract. Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\times 2$ game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time dynamics the unique Nash equilibrium is unstable. However, for sample sizes greater than one, we present… CONTINUE READING

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