# Some random observations

@article{Jaynes2004SomeRO, title={Some random observations}, author={Edwin T. Jaynes}, journal={Synthese}, year={2004}, volume={63}, pages={115-138} }

ConclusionOf course, the rationale of PME is so different from what has been taught in “orthodox” statistics courses for fifty years, that it causes conceptual hangups for many with conventional training. But beginning students have no difficulty with it, for it is just a mathematical model of the natural, common sense way in which anybody does conduct his inferences in problems of everyday life.The difficulties that seem so prominent in the literature today are, therefore, only transient…

## 19 Citations

Unscrambling Subjective and Epistemic Probabilities

- Philosophy
- 2019

Lewis’s notion of chances is modified, and his Principal Principle is extended in what it is argued is a very natural way (which makes chances fundamentally conditional), and a systematic way of drawing these distinctions is proposed in order to take this into account.

3 0 Ju l 2 01 9 Randomness ? What randomness ?

- Mathematics
- 2019

This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability,…

3 0 N ov 2 01 9 Randomness ? What randomness ?

- Mathematics
- 2019

This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability,…

Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory

- Mathematics
- 2004

We describe and develop a close relationship between two problems that have customarily been regarded as distinct: that of maximizing entropy, and that of minimizing worst-case expected loss. Using a…

On the relation between plausibility logic and the maximum-entropy principle: a numerical study

- PhilosophyArXiv
- 2009

A numerical collection of plausibility distributions given by the maximum-entropy principle and by plausibility logic for a set of fifteen simple problems: throwing dice.

Frequentism as a positivism: a three-tiered interpretation of probability

- Philosophy, Psychology
- 2013

I explore an alternate clarification of the idea of frequency probability, called frequency judgment. I then distinguish three distinct senses of probability — physical chance, frequency judgment,…

Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle

- PhilosophyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
- 2019

An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one…

The Objective Bayesian Probability that an Unknown Positive Real Variable Is Greater Than a Known Is 1/2

- MathematicsPhilosophies
- 2021

If there are two dependent positive real variables x1 and x2, and only x1 is known, what is the probability that x2 is larger versus smaller than x1? There is no uniquely correct answer according to…

## References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 10 REFERENCES

Theory of Probability.

- Computer Science
- 1940

This book is a searching analysis of the fundamental principles of the theory of probability and of the particular judgments involved in its application to concrete problems and is in agreement with the views expressed by Dr. Wrinch and the present reviewer.

The well-posed problem

- Mathematics
- 1973

Many statistical problems, including some of the most important for physical applications, have long been regarded as underdetermined from the standpoint of a strict frequency definition of…

On the rationale of maximum-entropy methods

- Computer ScienceProceedings of the IEEE
- 1982

We discuss the relations between maximum-entropy (MAXENT) and other methods of spectral analysis such as the Schuster, Blackman-Tukey, maximum-likelihood, Bayesian, and Autoregressive (AR, ARMA, or…

The interpretation of inductive probabilities

- Psychology
- 1972

An apparent inconsistency in the inductive logic interpretation of probabilities is examined and resolved.