Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

  title={Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium},
  author={Jobst Heitzig and Forest W. Simmons},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
We introduce the following basic voting method: voters submit both a “consensus” and a “fall-back” ballot. If all “consensus” ballots name the same option, it wins; otherwise, a randomly drawn “fall-back” ballot decides. If there is one potential consensus option that everyone prefers to the benchmark lottery which picks the favorite of a randomly drawn voter, then naming that option on all “consensus” ballots builds a very strong form of correlated equilibrium. Unlike common consensus… 
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior
Efficient Non-Cooperative Provision of Costly Positive Externalities via Conditional Commitments
We consider games where individual contributions are costly but beneficial to other players, so that contributing nothing is a dominant strategy. Considering that players may be unable to write
An introduction to the theory of mechanism design
What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to
Bottom-up linking of carbon markets under far-sighted cap coordination and reversibility
The Paris Agreement relies on nationally determined contributions to reach its targets and asks countries to increase ambitions over time, leaving open the details of this process. Although
Bottom-Up Strategic Linking of Carbon Markets: Which Climate Coalitions Would Farsighted Players Form?
We present typical scenarios and general insights from a novel dynamic model of farsighted cli- mate coalition formation involving market linkage and cap coordination, using a simple analytical model
Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games
The proposed strategy redistributes liabilities according to past compliance levels in a proportionate and timely way and can be used to implement any given allocation of target contributions, and it is proved that it has several strong stability properties.
Degrees of individual and groupwise backward and forward responsibility in extensive-form games with ambiguity, and their application to social choice problems
This work presents several different quantitative responsibility metrics that assess responsibility degrees in units of probability and finds that while most properties one might desire of such responsibility metrics can be fulfilled by some variant, an optimal metric that clearly outperforms others has yet to be found.
The Consensus Functional Equation in Agreement Theory
The concept of the consensus functional equation, for a bivariate map defined on an abstract choice set, appears in the analysis of sufficiently robust agreements arising in Social Choice, and is studied, relating them to the notion of a rationalizable agreement rule.
The Consensus Approach
This chapter presents the so-called consensus approach in which the scenarios are analysed in a workshop and a decision is made if a consensus is reached, presenting the main advantages and limitations of the approach.
Dynamics on networks. Case of Heterogeneous Opinion Status Model
It is shown that not only clear topological network properties, such as node degree, but also, the nodes' status distribution (the factor of network heterogeneity) play an important role in so-called opinion spreading and information diffusion on a network.


Social choice with procedural preferences
Participants in an aggregation procedure have preferences not only over outcomes but also over procedural features (such as preferring consensus, preferring to be in the majority, preferring not
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities
Abstract The ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that
Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
This paper introduces a new axiom for choice in preference profiles and tournaments, called composition-consistency. A social choice function is composition-consistent if it is non-sensitive to the
Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy
Abstract We extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium to a class of matching games with private information. This solution concept is applied to an adverse selection insurance economy and
Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show that for a large body of correlation schemes which