Some Laws of Nature are Metaphysically Contingent

  title={Some Laws of Nature are Metaphysically Contingent},
  author={John T. Roberts},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={445 - 457}
  • John T. Roberts
  • Published 1 September 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Laws of nature are puzzling because they have a ‘modal character’—they seem to be ‘necessary-ish’—even though they also seem to be metaphysically contingent. And it is hard to understand how contingent truths could have such a modal character. Scientific essentialism is a doctrine that seems to dissolve this puzzle, by showing that laws of nature are actually metaphysically necessary. I argue that even if the metaphysics of natural kinds and properties offered by scientific essentialism is… 
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