Some Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Discrimination, Co-Operation and Perceptions of Fairness

@inproceedings{HargreavesHeap2002SomeEE,
  title={Some Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Discrimination, Co-Operation and Perceptions of Fairness},
  author={Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis},
  year={2002}
}
When two people agree to trade, they unlock a mutual benefit, resolve a potential conflict and gain in proportion to their relative "aggression", eg the Hawk--Dove game. In an experiment with this game, a discriminatory convention evolved when half of the players were randomly assigned a red and the other half a blue label. Later, the same players were also offered the option of co--operating. Those disadvantaged by the colour--based discriminatory convention co--operated with one another most… 

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