Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory

@article{Egan2007SomeCT,
  title={Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory},
  author={Andy Egan},
  journal={The Philosophical Review},
  year={2007},
  volume={116},
  pages={93-114}
}
  • A. Egan
  • Published 2007
  • Philosophy
  • The Philosophical Review
Many philosophers have been converted to causal decision theory by something like the following line of argument: Evidential decision theory endorses irrational courses of action in a range of examples and endorses "an irrational policy of managing the news" (Lewis 1981, 5). These are fatal problems for evidential decision theory. Causal decision theory delivers the right results in the troublesome examples and does not endorse this kind of irrational news-managing. So we should give up… 

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