Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle
@article{Elhauge2012SolvingTP, title={Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle}, author={Einer R. Elhauge and Alexander Krueger}, journal={Texas Law Review}, year={2012}, volume={91}, pages={283} }
Courts and commentators are sharply divided about how to assess “reverse payment” patent settlements under antitrust law. The essential problem is that a PTO-issued patent provides only a probabilistic indication that courts would hold that the patent is actually valid and infringed, and parties have incentives to structure reverse payment settlements to exclude entry for longer than this patent probability would merit. Some favor comparing the settlement exclusion period to the expected…
29 Citations
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