Solving Large Extensive-Form Games with Strategy Constraints

@article{Davis2019SolvingLE,
  title={Solving Large Extensive-Form Games with Strategy Constraints},
  author={Trevor Davis and Kevin Waugh and Michael H. Bowling},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1809.07893}
}
  • Trevor Davis, Kevin Waugh, Michael H. Bowling
  • Published in AAAI 2019
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many situations, however, we would like to constrain the set of possible strategies. For example, constraints are a natural way to model limited resources, risk mitigation, safety, consistency with past observations of behavior, or other secondary objectives for an… CONTINUE READING
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