Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate

  title={Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate},
  author={Dries R. Goossens and Sander Onderstal and Jan Pijnacker and Frits C. R. Spieksma},
In May 2011, our collaboration with housing corporation Stadgenoot culminated in the first combinatorial auction for housing space in a newly erected multistory building in Amsterdam in the Netherlands. Our primary goal was to allocate space based on the preferences of many potential users. The resulting allocation included space for restaurants, boutiques, a dentist, and residential users. The auction we designed maximized total rent for Stadgenoot while complying with municipal and building… 

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