Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

  title={Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China},
  author={Lily L. Tsai},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={355 - 372}
  • Lily L. Tsai
  • Published 1 May 2007
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that… 

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