Corpus ID: 15138640

Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical

@article{Brasser2017SoftwareGE,
  title={Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical},
  author={Ferdinand Brasser and Urs M{\"u}ller and Alexandra Dmitrienko and Kari Kostiainen and Srdjan Capkun and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2017},
  volume={abs/1702.07521}
}
Intel SGX isolates the memory of security-critical applications from the untrusted OS. However, it has been speculated that SGX may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks through shared caches. We developed new cache attack techniques customized for SGX. Our attack differs from other SGX cache attacks in that it is easy to deploy and avoids known detection approaches. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on two case studies: RSA decryption and genomic processing. While cache timing… Expand
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