Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications

  title={Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications},
  author={Franz Wirl},
  journal={Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  • F. Wirl
  • Published 9 August 1998
  • Economics
  • Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Abstract. Corruption all over the world is an ancient, but it seems very topical too, concern in politics and in the media. This paper investigates spatial and dynamic aspects of corruption using cellular automata. Although cellular automata are very simple, deterministic machines and thus crude approximations of real, economic situations, they are capable of describing self organization and complex patterns (of corruption). It is shown that neither social pressure nor pure economic incentives… 
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