• DOI:10.1177/0047117818774722
• Corpus ID: 149757296

Societies are not the only source of multiplicity

@article{Corry2018SocietiesAN,
  title={Societies are not the only source of multiplicity},
  author={Olaf Corry},
  journal={International Relations},
  year={2018},
  volume={32},
  pages={243 - 245}
}

• Olaf Corry
• Published 1 June 2018
• Political Science
• International Relations

Political Science distinct as a discipline. Arguably, Political Science is distinct for its interest in ‘power’. Assuming this is accurate, the question becomes, ‘Which is the more crucial analytical feature of IR: power or multiplicity?’ If it is the former, then IR should remain a subfield (‘distinct’ only for its substantive interest in its international dimensions); if the latter, then perhaps IR does warrant its own discipline. The emphasis on power is not exclusive to realism; it is a descriptive statement about a basic constituent element of politics (like time for History). All IR theory asks questions about the meaning of power and gives it a central explanatory role in International Relations. The centrality of power is something Political Science and IR share, and where IR has made important contributions. The biggest dilemma for Rosenberg’s concept of ‘societal multiplicity’ is that it requires the reification of ‘society’ (tribal, national, imperial, etc.) to permit an ontology in which ‘each’ society can be taken as a separate unit, making it possible to conceive of a ‘system’ of multiple societies. Rosenberg’s argument hinges on the ‘levels-of-analysis’, since ‘multiplicity’ is – and can only be – an emergent quality of the ‘international system’. Does the distinction between the ‘second’ and ‘third images’ really provide sufficient intellectual justification for an independent IR? This would put IR in a precarious position where a method of separating ‘units’ and ‘structures’ for analytical purposes becomes the de facto ontology upon which the entire discipline rests. Furthermore, the question remains whether societal multiplicity (including ‘difference’, ‘interaction’, ‘combination’, and ‘dialectical change’) is really unique to ‘international relations’? Arguably, this framework equally describes multiplicity within and between ‘societies’, which undermines the case for an independent IR. Thus, Rosenberg’s conception of IR remains oddly ‘Westphalian’, in that it must reify unitary societies to imagine differences between them.