Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis

  title={Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis},
  author={P. Roos and M. Gelfand and D. Nau and Janetta Lun},
  journal={Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
  • P. Roos, M. Gelfand, +1 author Janetta Lun
  • Published 2015
  • Psychology
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
  • The strengths of social norms vary considerably across cultures, yet little research has shown whether such differences have an evolutionary basis. Integrating research in cross-cultural psychology with evolutionary game theory, we show that groups that face a high degree of threat develop stronger norms for organizing social interaction, with a higher degree of norm–adherence and higher punishment for deviant behavior. Conversely, groups that have little threat can afford to have weaker norms… CONTINUE READING
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