Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis

@inproceedings{Roos2015SocietalTA,
  title={Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis},
  author={Patrick Roos and Michele J. Gelfand and Dana Nau and Janetta Lun},
  year={2015}
}
The strengths of social norms vary considerably across cultures, yet little research has shown whether such differences have an evolutionary basis. Integrating research in cross-cultural psychology with evolutionary game theory, we show that groups that face a high degree of threat develop stronger norms for organizing social interaction, with a higher degree of norm–adherence and higher punishment for deviant behavior. Conversely, groups that have little threat can afford to have weaker norms… CONTINUE READING

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How culture gets embrained: Cultural differences in event-related potentials of social norm violations.

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