Social responsibility is the crucial factor in adopting early vaccination plans

  title={Social responsibility is the crucial factor in adopting early vaccination plans},
  author={Harris V. Georgiou},
Early vaccination of the general population is a very crucial aspect in the successful mitigation of highly infectious diseases, as it is the case of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The perception of possible side-effects from early batches of vaccines, presumably under-tested, is often a hindering factor for people not in high-risk categories to opt-in for early vaccination. In this work, early vaccination is formulated under a game-theoretic view with preference ranking and expectation maximization… 
To Vaccinate or Not? Decision-Making in the Time of COVID-19 Vaccines
  • C. Groenewald
  • Sociology
    Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies
  • 2021
Valuable insights are offered into decision-making related to COVID-19 vaccine uptake, shedding light on the importance of vaccine literacy, trust, and social responsibility in this process.


Individual variation in susceptibility or exposure to SARS-CoV-2 lowers the herd immunity threshold
It is shown that variation in susceptibility or exposure to infection can reduce estimates of herd immunity to SARS-CoV-2, and this is of paramount importance in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic.
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Inetlligence and Machine Learning)
The aim of this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory, formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value.
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
This talk introduces basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value, and introduces the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting.
Game theory and economics
Introduction to Game Theory and Outline of the Book Optimal Decentralised Decisions Non-Cooperative Games with Complete and Perfect Information Non-Cooperative Games with Imperfect or Incomplete
Elements of Game Theory - Part I: Foundations, acts and mechanisms
In this paper, a gentle introduction to Game Theory is presented in the form of basic concepts and examples. Minimax and Nash's theorem are introduced as the formal definitions for optimal strategies