Social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selection

@inproceedings{Boadway2006SocialIA,
  title={Social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selection},
  author={Robin Boadway and Manuel Leite-Monteiro and Maurice G. Marchand and Pierre Pestieau},
  year={2006}
}
Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are… CONTINUE READING
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