Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

  title={Social decision rules are not immune to conflict},
  author={Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray},
Why is rent-seeking so endemic in societies? Might it not be possible to design a Pareto-improving social decision rule that sidesteps the inefficient waste of resources resulting from conflict? We study this question for a multiplayer contest. We assume that a benevolent planner knows the winning payoffs, the effectiveness of each rent-seeker, that the cost of expending resources is isoelastic,and that it is the same across all players. But she does not know the precise value of this… CONTINUE READING

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Implementation , Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information

J. Moore

Conflict and distribution

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