Social Welfare Functions When Preferences Are Convex , Strictly Monotonic , and Continuous

  title={Social Welfare Functions When Preferences Are Convex , Strictly Monotonic , and Continuous},
  author={Ehud Kalai and Eitan Muller and Mark Satterthwaite},
The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings i restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives i R n, n > 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies… CONTINUE READING
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