Corpus ID: 9740894

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

@article{Anderlini2007SocialMA,
  title={Social Memory and Evidence from the Past},
  author={L. Anderlini and Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff},
  journal={Yale Economics Department Research Papers},
  year={2007}
}
Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the theory of rational strategic behavior. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in an extended Prisoner's Dilemma game in which an additional possibility of… Expand
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