Social Choice Scoring Functions

  title={Social Choice Scoring Functions},
  author={H. Peyton Young},
  journal={Siam Journal on Applied Mathematics},
  • H. Young
  • Published 1 June 1975
  • Economics
  • Siam Journal on Applied Mathematics
Let a committee of voters be considering a finite set $A = \{ {a_1 ,a_2 , \cdots ,a_m } \}$ of alternatives for election. Each voter is assumed to rank the alternatives according to his preferences in a strict linear order. A social choice function is a rule which, to every finite committee of voters with specified preference orders, assigns a nonempty subset of A, interpreted as the set of “winners”. A social choice function is consistent if, whenever two disjoint committees meeting separately… 
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