• Corpus ID: 53371491

Social Change and the Conformity Trap∗

  title={Social Change and the Conformity Trap∗},
  author={James Andreoni and Nikos Nikiforakis and Simon Siegenthaler},
The ability of societies to adapt to a changing world is critical for welfare. We present evidence from a new laboratory experiment in which individuals’ preferences change over time and there is a pressure to conform to the behavior of the majority. In the baseline environment, groups fail to adapt behavior to the changing circumstances despite the common knowledge that it has become inefficient and undesirable to almost all group members. We then explore factors that may help avoid these… 

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  • Eugen Dimant
  • Economics, Psychology
    Journal of Economic Psychology
  • 2019


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