Corpus ID: 239769336

SoK: Securing Email -- A Stakeholder-Based Analysis (Extended Version)

@inproceedings{Clark2018SoKSE,
  title={SoK: Securing Email -- A Stakeholder-Based Analysis (Extended Version)},
  author={Jeremy Clark and Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott Ruoti and Kent Seamons and Daniel Zappala},
  year={2018}
}
While email is the most ubiquitous and interoperable form of online communication today, it was not conceived with strong security guarantees, and the ensuing security enhancements are, by contrast, lacking in both ubiquity and interoperability. This situation motivates our research. We begin by identifying a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in the current email system and in efforts to provide secure solutions. We then use the tussle among stakeholders to explain the evolution of… Expand

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