So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems

@article{Galasso2015SoCP,
  title={So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems},
  author={Vincenzo Galasso and Tommaso Nannicini},
  journal={Political Behavior: Voting \& Public Opinion eJournal},
  year={2015}
}
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