• Corpus ID: 234767638

Slow persuasion

  title={Slow persuasion},
  author={Matteo Escud'e and Ludvig Sinander},
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a ‘sender’ provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel ‘viscosity’ dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender’s equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision… 

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