• Corpus ID: 234767638

Slow persuasion

@inproceedings{Escude2019SlowP,
  title={Slow persuasion},
  author={Matteo Escud'e and Ludvig Sinander},
  year={2019}
}

• Matteo Escud'e, Ludvig Sinander
• Published 21 March 2019
• Economics

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a ‘sender’ provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel ‘viscosity’ dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender’s equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substan-tial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.