Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model

  title={Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model},
  author={Nick Bostrom},
The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model appears… 
The evidential relevance of self-locating information
Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the generalized Sleeping Beauty problem
It is argued that although my favoured reasoning for the 1/3 answer does have the consequence in question, this consequence is quite acceptable given my treatment of the original problem, and can be seen to be unobjectionable.
Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that
Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence
Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“halfers”) and those endorsing the “1/3 view” (“thirders”). The disagreement concerns the evidential
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
How much do I learn when I learn what time it is, or where I am, or who I am? Beliefs about one's spatio temporal location and beliefs about one's identity are often called "self-locating" beliefs.1
Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution
  • Laureano Luna
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2020
The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still
Perspective Reasoning and the Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem
This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. The main argument
A Bayesian General Theory of Anthropic Reasoning
A causal anthropic decision theory is developed that handles examples like Bostrom's Lazy Adam scenario and specifies exactly what is and what is not an observer, how to choose a reference class and how to select a prior probability distribution that can be used when selecting randomly from the reference class.
How to Reason about Self-Locating Belief
When reasoning about self-locating belief, one should reason as if one were a randomly selected bit of information. This principle can be considered to be an application of Bostrom's Strong
On the Sleeping Beauty problem
The Sleeping Beauty problem is a well-known problem in self-locating theory. The reason why it is so widely known is that it is a probability theoretic problem where there appear to be two di erent


Reflections on Sleeping Beauty
Adam Elga (2000) presents a puzzle, the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ puzzle, which concerns the updating of belief when a person, Sleeping Beauty, finds something out about her temporal location in the world.
Sleeping Beauty and the forgetful Bayesian
1. Consider the case of Sleeping Beauty: on Sunday she is put to sleep, and she knows that on Monday experimenters will wake her up, and then put her to sleep with a memory-erasing drug that causes
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned
Self‐locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
The Sleeping Beauty problem:1 Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss
Beauty and the Bets
A diachronic Dutch Book argument in favor of 1/3 is offered in the Sleeping Beauty problem, where Beauty is uncertain whether the outcome of a certain coin toss was heads or tails.
The Mysteries of Self-Locating Belief and Anthropic Reasoning
§1. HOW BIG IS THE SMALLEST FISH IN THE POND? YOU TAKE YOUR WIDE-MESHED fishing net and catch one hundred fish, every one of which is greater than six inches long. Does this evidence support the
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief
Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy
Preface Content Acknowledgements Chapter1: Introduction Observation selection effects A brief history of anthropic reasoning Synopsis of this book Chapter 2: Fine- Tuning Arguments in Cosmology Does
The doomsday argument
If the human race is going to survive for many hundred thousand years, either at its present size or at the much larger size it would reach if it spread through the galaxy, then we are very
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
We subjectivists conceive of probability as the measure of reasonable partial belief. But we need not make war against other conceptions of probability, declaring that where subjective credence