Skolem's paradox and constructivism

@article{McCarty1987SkolemsPA,
  title={Skolem's paradox and constructivism},
  author={Charles McCarty and Neil Tennant},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  year={1987},
  volume={16},
  pages={165-202}
}
  • C. McCarty, N. Tennant
  • Published 1 May 1987
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Journal of Philosophical Logic
Les AA. soutiennent que les mathematiques intuitionnistes ne donnent pas lieu au paradoxe de Skolem. Ils soutiennent de plus que les preuves connues du theoreme de Lowenheim-Skolem sont inacceptables d'un point de vue constructiviste. Ils en tirent les consequences pour une philosophie des mathematiques intuitionniste 
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