# Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

@article{Bartholdi1991SingleTV, title={Single transferable vote resists strategic voting}, author={John J. Bartholdi and James B. Orlin}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, year={1991}, volume={8}, pages={341-354} }

We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candiate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the… Expand

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