Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
@article{Bartholdi1991SingleTV,
title={Single transferable vote resists strategic voting},
author={J. J. Bartholdi and James B. Orlin},
journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
year={1991},
volume={8},
pages={341-354}
}We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candiate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the… CONTINUE READING
Supplemental Presentations
Figures and Topics from this paper
Figures
336 Citations
Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues
- Computer Science
- AAMAS
- 2019
- 4
- PDF
Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote
- Computer Science
- Computational Foundations of Social Choice
- 2010
- 6
- PDF
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
- Computer Science
- AAMAS '07
- 2007
- 64
- PDF
References
SHOWING 1-10 OF 39 REFERENCES
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
- Economics
- 1985
- 101
Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- Computer Science, Mathematics
- Discret. Appl. Math.
- 1982
- 83
To vote or not to vote: What is the quota?
- Computer Science, Mathematics
- Discret. Appl. Math.
- 1989
- 25
- PDF