Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

@article{Bartholdi1991SingleTV,
  title={Single transferable vote resists strategic voting},
  author={J. J. Bartholdi and James B. Orlin},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={1991},
  volume={8},
  pages={341-354}
}
  • J. J. Bartholdi, James B. Orlin
  • Published 1991
  • Computer Science
  • Social Choice and Welfare
  • We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candiate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the… CONTINUE READING
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