Single-dipped preferences

  title={Single-dipped preferences},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a} and Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno},
  • Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
  • Published 2009
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules de…ned on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules’range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider di¤erent subclasses of single-dipped… CONTINUE READING

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" Strategyproof on binary ranges " , mimeo

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