Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient

@inproceedings{Feldman2013SimultaneousAA,
  title={Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient},
  author={M. Feldman and Hu Fu and N. Gravin and Brendan Lucier},
  booktitle={STOC '13},
  year={2013}
}
Simultaneous item auctions are simple and practical procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits independent bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation and prices are then resolved for each item separately, based solely on the bids submitted on that item. We study the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneous first- and second-price auctions when bidders have complement-free (a.k… Expand
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On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
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Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
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