# Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy

@inproceedings{Elkind2022SimultaneousCW, title={Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy}, author={Edith Elkind and Abheek Ghosh and Paul W Goldberg}, booktitle={Algorithmic Game Theory}, year={2022} }

. We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-speciﬁc criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce outputs for a set of activities, and the winning criteria of the contests are based on these outputs. We consider two vari-ations of the model: (i) players have costs for producing outputs; (ii) players…

## One Citation

### Competition among Parallel Contests

- Computer ScienceWINE
- 2022

An upper bound on the utility of any strategy is given and a method to construct a strategy whose utility can guarantee a constant ratio of this upper bound in the worst case is proposed.

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