Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol

  title={Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol},
  author={Shor and Preskill},
  journal={Physical review letters},
  volume={85 2},
  • ShorPreskill
  • Published 1 March 2000
  • Computer Science
  • Physical review letters
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use… 

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    2010 3rd International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology
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  • 1999
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