• Corpus ID: 220546573

Simple posted pricing mechanisms for selling a divisible item

  title={Simple posted pricing mechanisms for selling a divisible item},
  author={Ioannis Caragiannis and Apostolis Kerentzis},
We study the problem of selling a divisible item to agents who have concave valuation functions for fractions of the item. This is a fundamental problem with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth or cloud computing services. We focus on simple sequential posted pricing mechanisms that use linear pricing, i.e., a fixed price for the whole item and proportional prices for fractions of it. We present results of the following form that can be thought of as analogs of the well… 


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