Corpus ID: 211677662

Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents

@article{Feng2020SimpleMF,
  title={Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents},
  author={Yiding Feng and Jason D. Hartline and Yingkai Li},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2003.00545}
}
  • Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li
  • Published 2020
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • We consider agents with non-linear preferences given by private values and private budgets. We quantify the extent to which posted pricing approximately optimizes welfare and revenue for a single agent. We give a reduction framework that extends the approximation of multi-agent pricing-based mechanisms from linear utility to nonlinear utility. This reduction framework is broadly applicable as Alaei et al. (2012) have shown that mechanisms for linear agents can generally be interpreted as… CONTINUE READING

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