Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements

@inproceedings{Feldman2016SimpleMF,
  title={Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements},
  author={M. Feldman and Ophir Friedler and J. Morgenstern and Guy Reiner},
  booktitle={EC '16},
  year={2016}
}
  • M. Feldman, Ophir Friedler, +1 author Guy Reiner
  • Published in EC '16 2016
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. Devanur et al. [2015] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of O(log m) for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on the PoA of single bid auctions was known for valuations exhibiting complements. We introduce a hierarchy over valuations, where levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity, and the… CONTINUE READING
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