Signaling in Matching Markets

@inproceedings{Coles2007SignalingIM,
  title={Signaling in Matching Markets},
  author={Peter Coles and Alexey Kushnir},
  year={2007}
}
We evaluate the e¤ect of costless preference signaling in two-sided matching markets between …rms and workers. We consider a game of incomplete information with …rm segments. Workers agree on the ranking of …rms across "segments," but have idiosyncratic and uniformly distributed preferences within segments. Firm preferences over workers are idiosyncratic and uniformly distributed. Each worker can send a limited number of signals to …rms. Then, each …rm makes an o¤er to a worker. Finally… CONTINUE READING

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