Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization

@article{Emek2014SignalingSF,
  title={Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization},
  author={Y. Emek and M. Feldman and Iftah Gamzu and Renato Paes Leme and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2014},
  volume={abs/1202.1590}
}
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study of signaling when conducting a second price auction of a probabilistic good whose actual instantiation is known to the auctioneer but not to the bidders. This framework can be used to model impressions selling in display advertising. We establish several… Expand
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