Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

@article{Cho1987SignalingGA,
  title={Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria},
  author={In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={1987},
  volume={102},
  pages={179-221}
}
Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and… 

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