• Corpus ID: 17521519

Signaling, Learning and Screening Prior to Trial: A Theory of Preliminary Injunctions

  title={Signaling, Learning and Screening Prior to Trial: A Theory of Preliminary Injunctions},
  author={Thomas D. Jeitschko and Byung-Cheol Kim},
The decision to request a preliminary injunction-a court order that bans a party from certain behavior until its lawfulness is ascertained in a final court ruling at trial-is an important litigation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright, patents, trademarks, employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process of filing for a preliminary injunction and the court's ruling on such a request generates information that can affect possible settlement… 
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