Sift - An Efficient Method for Co-residency Detection on Amazon EC2

@inproceedings{Chen2016SiftA,
  title={Sift - An Efficient Method for Co-residency Detection on Amazon EC2},
  author={Kang Chen and Qingni Shen and Cong Li and Yang Luo and Yahui Yang and Zhonghai Wu},
  booktitle={ICISSP},
  year={2016}
}
Cloud computing, an emerging computing and service paradigm, where the computing and storage capabilities are outsourced on demand, offers the advanced capabilities of sharing and multi-tenancy. But security has been a major barrier for its adoption to enterprise, as being placed with other tenants on the same physical machine (i.e. co-residency or co-location) poses a particular risk. Former research has shown how side channels in shared hardware may enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive… 

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